So Much For the Commerce Clause Challenge to Individual Mandate Being  Frivolous by Barnett, Randy E
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2011 
So Much For the Commerce Clause Challenge to Individual 
Mandate Being "Frivolous" 
Randy E. Barnett 
Georgetown University Law Center, rb325@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-003 
 
 




1 J.L. (1 The Post) 373-376 (2011) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
FROM: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
So MUCH FOR THE COMMERCE 




R emember when the Commerce Clause challenge to the in-dividual insurance mandate was dismissed by all serious and knowledgeable constitutional law professors and Nancy 
Pelosi as "frivolous"? Well, as Jonathan notes below, the administra-
tion is now apparently telling the New York Times that the individ-
ual insurance "requirement" and "penalty" is really an exercise of the 
Tax Power of Congress. 
Administration officials say the tax argument is a linchpin of 
their legal case in defense of the health care overhaul and its 
individual mandate, now being challenged in court by more 
than 20 states and several private organizations. 
Let that sink in for a moment. If the Commerce Clause claim of 
power were a slam dunk, as previously alleged, would there be any 
need now to change or supplement that theory? Maybe the admin-
istration lawyers confronted the inconvenient fact that the Com-
merce Clause has never in history been used to mandate that all 
Americans enter into a commercial relationship with a private com-
pany on pain of a "penalty" enforced by the IRS. So there is no Su-
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preme Court ruling that such a claim of power is constitutional. In 
short, this claim of power is both factually and judicially unprece-
dented. 
Remarkably, and to its credit, the NYT informs its readers about 
2 key facts that pose a problem with the tax theory - and without 
even attributing these to the measure's opponents. 
And 
Congress anticipated a constitutional challenge to the individ-
ual mandate. Accordingly, the law includes 10 detailed find-
ings meant to show that the mandate regulates commercial ac-· 
tivity important to the nation's economy. Nowhere does 
Congress cite its taxing power as a source of authority. 
The law describes the levy on the uninsured as a "penalty" ra-
ther than a tax. 
This is a sign that NYT's reporter Robert Pear is on the ball. But 
wait! There is more that is not in the article. 
The Supreme Court has defined a tax as having a revenue raising 
purpose - a requirement that is usually easy to satisfy. But in the 
section of the act that specifically identifies all of its revenue raising 
provisions for purposes of scoring its costs (which is a big deal), the 
insurance mandate "penalty" goes unmentioned. 
Unlike any other tax, according to the act, the failure to pay the 
penalty "shall not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty 
with respect to such failure." Nor shall the IRS "file notice of lien 
with respect to any property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure 
to pay the penalty imposed by this section," or "levy on any such 
property with respect to such failure." 
The article reports this response from the Justice Department: 
The Justice Department brushes aside the distinction, saying 
"the statutory label" does not matter. The constitutionality of 
a tax law depends on "its practical operation," not the precise 
form of words used to describe it, the department says, citing 
a long line of Supreme Court cases. 
Now there are cases that say ( 1) when Congress does not invoke 
a specific power for a claim of power, the Supreme Court will look 
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for a basis on which to sustain the measure; (2) when Congress does 
invoke its Tax power, such a claim is not defeated by showing the 
measure would be outside its commerce power if enacted as a regu-
lation (though there are some older, never-reversed precedents 
pointing the other way), and (3) the Courts will not look behind a 
claim by Congress that a measure is a tax with a revenue raising 
purpose. 
But I have so far seen no case that says (4) when a measure is ex-
pressly justified in the statute itself as a regulation of commerce (as 
the NYT accurately reports), the courts will look look behind that 
characterization during litigation to ask if it could have been justified 
as a tax, or (5) when Congress fails to include a penalty among all 
the "revenue producing" measures in a bill, the Court will neverthe-
less impute a revenue purpose to the measure. 
Now, of course, the Supreme Court can always adopt these two 
additional doctrines. It could decide that any measure passed and 
justified expressly as a regulation of commerce is constitutional if it 
could have been enacted as a tax. But if it upholds this act, it would 
also have to say that Congress can assert any power it wills over in-
dividuals so long as it delegates enforcement of the penalty to the 
IRS. Put another way since every "fine" collects money, the Tax 
Power gives Congress unlimited power to. fine any activity or, as 
here, inactivity it wishes! (Do you doubt this will be a major line of 
questioning in oral argument?) 
But it gets still worse. For calling this a tax does not change the 
nature of the "requirement" or mandate that is enforced by the 
"penalty." ALL previous cases of taxes upheld (when they may have 
exceeded the commerce power) involved "taxes" on conduct or ac-
tivity. None involved taxes on the refusal to engage in conduct. In 
short, none of these tax cases involved using the Tax Power to im-
pose a mandate. · 
So, like the invocation of the Commerce Clause, this invocation 
of the Tax Power is factually and judicially unprecedented. It is yet 
another unprecedented claim of Congressional power. Only this 
one is even more sweeping and dangerous than the Commerce 
Clause theory. 
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I responded to this theory in the Wall Street Journal back in 
April, in an op-ed the editors entitled The Insurance Mandate in 
Peril. 1 Here is a key passage from my op-ed: 
Supporters of the mandate cite U.S. v. Kahriser (1953), where 
the Court upheld a punitive tax on gambling by saying that 
"[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, 
courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing 
power." Yet the Court in Kahriser also cited Bailey with ap-
proval. The key to understanding Kahriser is the proposition 
the Court there rejected: "it is said that Congress, under the 
pretense of exercising its power to tax has attempted to penalize 
illegal intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of 
the Act" (emphasis added). 
In other words, the Court in Kahriser declined to look be-
hind Congress's assertion that it was exercising its tax power to 
see whether a measure was really a regulatory penalty. As the 
Court said in Sonzinsky v. U.S. (1937), "[i)nquiry into the hid-
den motives which may move Congress to exercise a power 
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of 
courts." But this principle cuts both ways. Neither will the 
Court look behind Congress's inadequate assertion of its com-
merce power to speculate as to whether a measure was "really" 
a tax. The Court will read the cards as Congress dealt them. 
My piece is not behind a subscription wall so interested readers 
can read (or reread) the whole thing. 
Now the usual caveat. Just because the constitutional challenge 
to the health insurance mandate is not frivolous does not mean it 
will prevail. The odds are always that the Supreme Court will uphold an 
act if Congress. Given the wording of the Act, however, the implica-
tions of doing so using the Tax Power are so sweeping and danger-
ous that I doubt a majority of the Court would adopt this claim of 
power on these facts. 
But the argument is far from over. I I 
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